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“In a world where we all have a joint interest in survival, the real absurdity is the 
absence of any system where that joint interest is effectively represented.”
(Dahl, 1970: 67)
Introductory Remarks: Global Affectedness, the Route Towards 
Cosmopolitanism
We may very well live in a globalized world, dominated by interna‑
tional trade and communications, where even those very few with lit‑
tle or no direct exposure to the modern technological world are now 
nonetheless affected by it, notably through diffuse phenomena such as 
environmental pollution and climate change. (Heilinger, 2020: 5)
But our world is not truly global, for even ignoring existing chau‑
vinistic sentiments, the fact of the matter is that our movement and 
political rights are by and large legally restricted by borders beyond 
which there is little to no recognition of our interests in policy ‑making 
processes. Despite this, there is general agreement that globalization is 
responsible for our interests being affected beyond the jurisdictions of 
the states that recognize us as their citizens. This, we surmise, raises a 
moral problem, for justifying whose and which affected interests 
should be recognized and how depends first and foremost on moral 
considerations.
1 This research work was conducted as part of the group project Cosmopolitanism: Justice, Democracy 
and Citizenship without Borders [PTDC/FER ‑FIL/30686/2017] and of the individual research 
scholarship A Hypothesis about the Natural Reason of Cosmopolitanism [SFRH/BD/145291/2019], 
both supported by the FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P, Portugal.
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Cosmopolitans have long sought to make sense of a global world, for 
they have traditionally tried to make sense of a “world/cosmic citizen‑
ship”, as against a citizenship restricted to the arbitrary borders of the state, 
which they long questioned as to its justification. As a doctrine or philo‑
sophical stance, cosmopolitanism has been around for over two millennia, 
and it has many roots in different schools of thought, but its general idea 
is captured by whichever may follow from our understanding of world 
citizenship. What this means for the particular framing of what we could 
call moral cosmopolitanism has changed throughout the years. From the 
works of the Stoics, passing through Kant, and reaching today, it is difficult 
to pinpoint an exact thesis that will fit all the moral understandings of 
self ‑proclaimed cosmopolitans. However, nowadays the literature on cos‑
mopolitanism has narrowed down on Pogge’s tripartite conjunctive defi‑
nition as the go ‑to textbook definition of moral cosmopolitanism: it 
comprises (1) ethical individualism, the thesis that human beings or per‑
sons are ultimate units of moral concern; (2) universality, the thesis that 
individualism concerns all persons equally; and (3) generality, that uni‑
versality applies for everyone (Pogge, 1992a: 48 ‑9). Conjoined, these theses 
mean that, irrespectively of their group of belonging (as defined by what‑
ever social identity marker such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, what 
have you at any given time), all individuals should be the target for equal 
moral concern in the minds of others. A more synoptic definition can read:
Moral cosmopolitanism: “Every human has a global stature as an ultimate 
unit of moral concern.” (Pogge, 2002: 169)
Somewhat surprisingly, however, it has turned out that even liberal 
nationalists – which one would expect to oppose cosmopolitanism –, have 
thought moral cosmopolitanism to be trivial. David Miller, for instance, 
has told us that it is a “platitudinous element” of morality that “every 
human being has equal moral worth, or in a different formulation that 
each person is equally an object of moral concern” (Miller, 2002: 81).
The nationalists’ rejection that moral cosmopolitanism should lead us 
towards the changes that would make our world truly global is reasona‑
ble. Simply put, a principle of equal concern or respect applying to all (Dwor‑
kin, 1977: 370) does not entail “surface level equality” or treating equally. 
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Indeed, equal concern might at times result in demands for unequal treat‑
ment, they think. On this basis, many authors have argued for the com‑
patibility of moral cosmopolitanism with liberal nationalism, with 
domestic egalitarianism, and with other parochial moralities which are 
less than global in the scope of their egalitarian demands of justice (e.g.: 
Scheffler, 1999; Santos, 2003; Appiah, 2005; Sassen, 2006; and Harvey, 2009).
In this essay, we will follow a common line of argument according 
to which it is possible to impartially justify partial treatment, such that 
restricting the scope of egalitarian demands of distributive justice to 
the state is compatible with moral cosmopolitanism. This common line 
of argument, however, depends on the application of Rawls’s relational 
principle of fairness to the provision of basic goods, which some critics 
have argued can be similarly used to justify extending the scope of 
egalitarian demands of justice beyond the state. This is because there 
are institutions that constitute a basic structure for the provision of 
basic goods and whose jurisdiction goes well ‑beyond state borders.
As we will see, however, these institutionalist approaches have been 
rightfully accused of not justifying a putative global egalitarianism 
either. But there is, we argue, a general problem with this family of 
relational approaches to the scope of egalitarianism: they are unyield‑
ingly founded upon institutionalism and the principle of fairness. This 
is a problem because we will show that there are at least some goods 
(namely, climate goods) whose provision is truly global and is (at least 
currently) beyond genuinely global institutional provision, such that 
we can find a relational foundation for global egalitarianism. The cost 
of such a move, however, depends on making do without the 
institutionally ‑grounded principle of fairness and embracing a novel 
principle of cosmopolitan inclusion which we introduce for the first 
time in the literature and begin to explore in this essay.
The Relational Foundations of Egalitarian Justice
As Win ‑Chiat Lee (2012: 282) made clear, the argument for restricting the 
scope of egalitarian justice to the state depends on the consistency between 
taking all humans to be of equal moral worth and simultaneously 
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allowing for special treatment or privileging some over others owed, per‑
haps, to some special relations. After all, it seems to be another platitude 
that parents should privilege their children over others, and this would 
be owed to their special relationship of parenthood, which justifies their 
special obligations and duties.
Liberal nationalists and domestic egalitarians must as such think it 
is possible to impartially justify the partial treatment they think is owed 
to co ‑nationals or co ‑citizens of a state owed to there being a special 
relationship holding among them which is lacking between individuals 
of different nationalities or statehood, respectively. Such a level of 
co ‑nationality or co ‑membership in a state should make them equal to 
the rule of law. Domestic egalitarians can as such hold there to be two 
different sources of moral reasons. Following Jeff McMahan (1997: 110), 
the first would impose on us duties which are blind to whichever rela‑
tions may hold between us (perhaps owed to our shared humanity), 
and the second would be those which arise from whichever special 
relations we might entertain with one another.
However, we believe it is at the very least inaccurate to ascribe the 
title of cosmopolitan (of “world citizen”) to those who believe egalitar‑
ian justice is to be restricted to the limits of state borders (see McMahan, 
1997: 117 and Brock, 2010: 11 ‑5 for similar concerns). Mathias Risse was 
surely right when he said that “the term cosmopolitan has become the 
victim of its own success” (2012). Understandably, more substantive 
cosmopolitans have thought it wise to make sure that even in the 
absence of such special relations we should still treat humans equally 
to some extent, and irrespectively of their group of belonging. The most 
common reason provided for doing so is rooted in many cosmopoli‑
tan’s traditional humanist stance. This allows us to formulate a more 
specific substantive moral cosmopolitanism:
Humanist cosmopolitanism: all humans should be treated equally in virtue 
of their shared humanity. (e.g.: Buchanan, 1990; Nussbaum, 1996 & 1997; 
and Caney, 2011)
However, some more substantive moral cosmopolitans believe 
that shared humanity only really does warrant equal concern or 
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respect, and that it might at best warrant equal treatment of the kind 
presupposed by such international law charters as the UDHR, that 
is, a minimal sense of global justice, entailing, for instance, a human‑
itarian duty of assistance, which domestic egalitarians can easily 
agree to. Despite this, they might still believe that the scope of egal‑
itarian justice is truly global, and one way to argue so is by entertain‑
ing a relational foundation for egalitarianism, but then go on to argue 
that the morally meaningful relations that determine the scope of 
egalitarian justice do nevertheless obtain, against the liberal nation‑
alist/domestic egalitarian intent, across the borders of current states 
(Lovett, 2016: 33). We can thus aptly call this form of substantive 
moral cosmopolitanism:
Relational cosmopolitanism: all humans should be treated equally because 
certain relations obtain between all of them. (e.g. the Rawlsian institution‑
alism of Beitz, 1979 and Pogge, 2002 & 2005, but also Barry & Valentini, 
2009, and the civic republican cosmopolitanism of Lovett, 2016)
There are different reasons why we believe relational cosmopolitan‑
ism to be the most promising way to argue, but we shall concern us 
here with this variety of cosmopolitanism in particular because we 
believe it to be most interesting to defeat the liberal nationalists and 
the domestic egalitarians at their own game, by turning their own argu‑
ments against their favoured conclusions. In adopting this strategy, we 
can build up the positive argument for cosmopolitanism while simul‑
taneously disabling the main argument for domestic egalitarianism.
We begin by making sense of what relations are there available to 
us that could ground the scope of a relational principle of egalitarian 
justice, where relationalism about scope is the thesis according to which 
the scope of principles of distributive justice are determined by which‑
ever relations hold between individuals.
Such a version of relationalism may in principle include (e.g.) spo‑
radic cooperative relations between unbeknownst persons, but also 
parenthood, and, lastly, co ‑nationality. But a sub ‑set of this thesis will 
consider only those relations between individuals which have to do 
with their particular associative relationships (thereby excluding 
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random interactions between non ‑associated persons). Thus, we would 
have associationalism, according to which the scope of principles of dis‑
tributive justice are determined by the extent of individuals’ voluntary 
associations.
But more often what we find is an even more restrictive form of 
relationalism, concerned only with associations characterized by eco‑
nomic, social, cultural, legal, and political institutions. According to 
institutionalism, the scope of principles of distributive justice are deter‑
mined by individuals’ institutional arrangements.
Notice that adoption of a relationalism like associationalism or insti‑
tutionalism does not require one to embrace communitarian metaphys‑
ics (and thus denying the ethical individualism that characterises 
liberalism and moral cosmopolitanism alike), for we can understand 
institutional relations along reductionist lines, that is, according to the 
thesis that there are fundamental moral facts underlying each discrete 
relation “such as promises, intimacy, or mutual interdependence 
between us” (Wellman, 2000: 539; Scheffler, 1997: 190) for which we 
value them. So, we do not need to attribute moral concern directly to 
any associations or institutions. Groups are relevant, yes, but only inso‑
far as they are of relevance for individuals. Our moral concern with 
groups is of second order.
Further notice that there need not be one and only one principle of 
justice. We could argue that an institutional principle holds true, and 
that would by itself tell us nothing about the existence of non ‑relational 
principles according to which duties of justice exist simply in virtue of 
shared humanity, or whether less exclusive relational principles, such 
as associative ones, would also hold true simultaneously.
The Institutionalist Argument for Domestic Egalitarianism
The most traditional defence of domestic egalitarianism is founded on 
Rawls’s relational
Principle of Fairness: (W)hen a number of persons engage in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict 
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their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have 
submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the 
part of those who have benefited from their submission. (Rawls, 1971: 112; 
after Hart’s 1955: 185 version of the principle formulated in terms of 
“mutuality of restrictions” on liberty.)
Consequently, under such a scheme of things, duties and obligations 
arise that demand of one not to be a free ‑rider (Arneson, 2016: 568). But 
what social relations qualify to be the ground for the determination of 
the scope of egalitarian justice according to this principle? Rawls 
thought that such a principle would apply to those basic structures that 
provide basic goods and distribute legal rights and obligations (Rawls, 
1971: 6). But a more comprehensive understanding reveals different 
empirical qualities of basic structures that allow to distinguish them 
normatively from other institutions: (1) they “determine and regulate 
the fundamental terms of social cooperation; (2) (…) have profound 
and pervasive impact upon persons’ life chance; or (3) (…) subject per‑
sons to coercion” (Abizadesh, 2007: 319).
Many, like Rawls, thought nations and states “involve a kind of insti‑
tutionalised reciprocity” (Miller, 2002: 82) that would qualify them as 
basic structures (e.g.: Miller, 1998; Blake, 2001; Nagel, 2005 and Sangio‑
vanni, 2007), but they differ as to why this is so. Blake (2001) and Nagel 
(2005), for instance, believe coercion is the difference ‑making quality. 
Sangiovanni (2007), in turn, argues that we can think of more funda‑
mental relations than coercion, which is not at all necessary, for we can 
imagine a coercion ‑free state that nonetheless maintains a legal ‑political 
system on which individuals depend to live prosperous lives. From this 
thought experiment he concludes that “it is the nonvoluntary, de facto 
authority of a legal system that requires a special justification in terms 
of a conception of socioeconomic equality” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 13). This 
state enjoys de facto authority “to impose duties, confer rights, issue 
directives, and demand compliance with them, and most of those sub‑
ject to it comply for reasons other than a fear of legally authorized sanc‑
tions” (idem), but because it restricts our lives while bringing mutual 
advantages, the arrangement requires special justification. What is 
more, “the mere exercise of political authority does not necessarily 
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violate our autonomy in the way coercion does; in fact, in many cases, 
it is necessary to preserve it” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 14). Indeed, it is pre‑
cisely because it tends to preserve autonomy that individuals would tend 
to continue to abide by it even in the absence of coercion (an aspect that 
Nagel’s theory implicitly assumes (2005: 128 ‑9)).
In anticipation of a critique to his argument, Sangiovanni recognizes 
that “noncompliance or exit from most major international organiza‑
tions, let alone the global institutional order as a whole, carries signif‑
icant costs for states subject to them, especially smaller and less 
powerful ones” (2007: 18), and goes on to argue that “the voluntary/
nonvoluntary distinction establishes a continuum positively related to 
the stringency of the norms which apply to it” (Sangiovanni: 18 ‑9). 
Consequently, Sangiovanni’s conclusion is not that there are no duties 
towards non ‑fellow citizens, nor that all forms of inequality are per‑
missive between states, but, rather, the more modest conclusion that 
the domestic demands of equality are much more stringent than the 
ones holding abroad. Why? – you may ask –, because – he trusts –, 
although abandoning international organizations comes at a big cost 
– indeed, the cost may be so high enough to be considered coercive 
(Blake & Smith, 2013: §3.2), such that “”(l)ove it or leave it”“(Sangio‑
vanni, 2007: 17) is not even an option, contra Sangiovanni’s suggestion 
–, the state remains the only institution that provides basic goods, such 
that “there is also no basis for redistribution” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 27) 
abroad.
On the application of the principle of fairness to the distribution of 
basic goods by basic structures, he concludes the state to be the only 
truly necessary institution for the safeguard of our autonomy, that is, 
to develop and act on a plan of life we choose to ourselves, and there‑
fore the one determining the scope of our duties and obligations of 
egalitarian justice, which do not extent to non ‑citizens, who do not 
partake in the provision of such basic goods necessary to protect our 
autonomy (Sangiovanni, 2007:19 ‑20).
Summarising this institutionalist argument for domestic egalitari‑
anism, it turns out that the kind of relations that matter for egalitarian 
justice are those relations of reciprocity necessary for the provision of basic 
goods, where equality has to do with the distribution of, and access to, 
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resources, welfare, opportunities, and other entities typically including 
“objects, qualities, positions within a system, or even human beings” 
(Galston, 1980: 112). More importantly, however, Sangiovanni’s thought 
experiment reveals that they are not just economic goods and services 
but are more generally understood as political and legal rights, such as 
those protecting private property, whose provision is not guaranteed 
by non ‑citizens, and consequently our egalitarian duties and obliga‑
tions do not extend towards them as they do towards co ‑citizens.
Extending the Institutionalist Argument Beyond Domestic 
Egalitarianism
We will now proceed to argue with many other authors that the rela‑
tions that are of moral relevance to the institutional argument do obtain 
beyond the borders of states, such that there is no way to uphold the 
domestic egalitarian conclusion. That is, applying the principle of fair‑
ness to the provision of basic goods does actually extend the egalitarian 
demands of justice beyond state borders. One way of doing so retains 
the institutionalist approach and argues that there is a developing sys‑
tem of organizations that constitute a Rawlsian “global basic struc‑
ture”, that is, an institutionalized network of social cooperation with 
worldwide reach providing the basic goods. As the author who pio‑
neered this approach put it, “the world is not made up of self ‑sufficient 
states. States participate in complex international economic, political, 
and cultural relationships that suggest the existence of a global scheme 
of social cooperation” (Beitz, 1979: 143 ‑4; Pogge, 2002 advances a sim‑
ilar proposal).
Domestic egalitarians like Sangiovanni (2007: 20) have retorted that 
such international institutions in fact have barely anything to do with 
the provision of basic goods, for although there are global institutions 
safeguarding the legal figure of the state as sovereign, and others, still, 
that are involved in international trade, such as the IMF, it is neverthe‑
less states that remain the providers of basic goods, with the small and 
infrequent exception of failed and occupied states (which by definition 
cannot themselves assure such a provision).
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Remember, Sangiovanni does not say no duties whatsoever ever 
arise between countries. As he sees it, these purported counter exam‑
ples are all illustrative of there being a duty of assistance, however 
simple and minor, which he believes follows from moral cosmopoli‑
tanism and is compatible with domestic egalitarianism.
But we find this answer very unsatisfying. One could easy reply by 
pointing out many non ‑extreme cases of inter ‑state provision of basic 
goods. There are everlasting tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethi‑
opia, owed to the great dependence of the former on the latter for the 
provision of water that flows through the river Nile. Some countries 
in Europe depend up to 100% from Russia for their provision of nat‑
ural gas, and this has been a central theme under the negotiations that 
lead to the annexation of Crimea by Russia without EU interference. 
Another great example that raises suspicion over the states’ capacity 
to protect property would be the territorial loss of island nation states 
in the Pacific due to rising sea levels, which is itself a consequence of 
anthropogenic global warming caused by other states’ policies. Coun‑
tering like ‑minded examples, Sangiovanni may claim that such provi‑
sion is nonetheless “regulated by domestic law” (2007: 15); nevertheless, 
that would be a poor reply, as states’ decisions on trade agreements 
are the fruit of multi ‑lateral negotiations, rather than unilateral decisions 
(see Barry & Valentini, 2009: 493, and especially Maffettone, 2014, for 
more detailed analysis of this line of argument). What is worse, as the 
island ‑nation states example shows, some states really are powerless 
in negotiations that could assure the protection of their territory, and 
with it any future value that private property could have within their 
borders.
Thus, institutionalists have concluded that on adopting a principle 
of fairness in the provision of basic goods we do end up with a global, 
rather than a domestic egalitarianism, and relational cosmopolitan‑
ism, that is, a moral cosmopolitanism of a more substantive kind is 
vindicated.
However, there is a major issue with the institutionalist approach. 
Despite crossing state ‑borders, the many networks of cooperation pro‑
viding basic goods that are institutionally mediated are not truly global 
either. Indeed, there is no institution in the world that covers the entire 
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globe. Even the most comprehensive international institutions, namely 
the UN, the IMF, and the WTO, fail to encompass all countries in the 
world, or have limited recognition of some members (e.g. the Vatican 
City/Holy See and the State of Palestine are non ‑members but perma‑
nent observers in the UN, the most comprehensive global governance 
institution). Thus, the patchwork of institutional relations can at best 
justify heterogeneous duties of reciprocity, a “patchwork of obliga‑
tions” (Miller, 2002: 83 ‑4), or, as another critic said, of “nested and over‑
lapping sets of obligations with varying geographical scope” (Arneson, 
2016: 570), such that the ensuing egalitarianism would be, at best, inter‑
national, but not truly global.
Towards Relational Global Egalitarianism Beyond Institutionalism
Absent institutions, one may think focusing on the provision of basic 
goods is not a viable path towards global egalitarianism. However, we 
intend to challenge this premise. We believe that the provision of basic 
goods does in fact depend to an important extent on non ‑institutional 
relations. Certainly, Sangiovanni would disagree with us (2007: 21), but 
the fact is that we do not need institutions or even explicit norms dic‑
tating the provision of basic goods for it to be justifiable that we should 
bring all humans under egalitarian justice.
Perhaps it is even better that we abandon the institutionalist approach, 
as it seems to be unavoidably pro ‑status quo. This is because, on focusing 
on the scope of existing institutions, although not prohibiting it, it can 
hardly justify forming institutions where they do not already exist, but 
where their existence might be necessary, and where that existence should 
be egalitarian. But if you find that what is made legally binding should 
accord to moral reasons, like we do, then there might be non ‑legally rec‑
ognized morally relevant relations of affectedness which should warrant 
inclusion under egalitarian justice. But taking on such an approach seem‑
ingly requires dropping out the principle of fairness as our guiding liberal 
principle for determining the scope of egalitarian justice.
There may be other independent reasons to drop the principle of 
fairness altogether. For notice that Rawls (1971: 343 ‑4) thought that the 
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principle of fairness ascribes obligations only insofar as they arise from 
voluntary relations (as does Scheffler, 1994: 7). To us, however, it is not 
at all clear that membership in states or nations is voluntary. Rawls 
could say that permission to leave is by and large dictated by how just 
the group is. But therein lies a problem, for what is just according to 
the principle of fairness need not be all that is just. And in practice it 
does not seem to be the case that one can freely decide to abandon and 
effectively abdicate from membership in a state. (Certainly not by just 
leaving its borders, as states retain personal jurisdiction over citizens 
even if they are abroad – that is what extradition is all about, after all.) 
Some authors are less restrictive and argue that all persons should have 
a right to freely leave the state (e.g.: Benhabib, 2002: 21), independently 
of whether the state is just or not. But, as Sangiovanni’s (2007) argu‑
ment goes, it is not clear whether there is a viable alternative to living 
in a state at all. That is the premise on which his thought ‑experiment 
weighs. Yet other reasons have been advanced for why national mem‑
bership is also not voluntary (see Anderson 1983 and Margalit & Raz, 
1990).
Surely, we cannot have duties to states just owed to the accident of 
having been born into them either. Furthermore, whilst there may be a 
duty to reciprocate (insofar as you still owe for the benefits you have 
received), there is no duty to continue on benefitting from any specific 
state, and so it should be possible to reject new beneficent acts coming 
in from the state, thereby cutting subsequent obligations that would 
ensue. But perhaps we do not even have such a duty to reciprocate to 
begin with, for new ‑borns are neither in a position to accept nor refuse 
benefits (they arguably do not even have a will on this)2. Indeed, what 
is worse for the viability of the principle is that it seems to entail that 
one can indebt others in duties or obligations by simply benefiting them 
against their will. As Nozick put it, “(o)ne cannot, whatever one’s pur‑
poses, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) 
payment” (1974: 95; see also: 90 ‑1; there are similar criticisms in Sim‑
mons, 1979: 128 ‑9 and Arneson, 1982 & 2016). Moreover, as Arneson 
(2016: 570) claims, the duties the principle would establish would not 
2 I owe Martin Sticker for calling my attention to this.
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necessarily be duties towards fellow citizens as a whole, but possibly 
duties originating from specific debts, and even if we were to latch on 
to a general cooperative scheme such as those resulting from taxation 
and public expenditure in welfare states, it is not obvious how this could 
give support to restricting egalitarianism to members of our own nation.
At any rate, we do not intend to solve these problems here3. Instead, 
we wish to make do without this principle. We need a principle that 
should make sense of the fact that there are mutual advantages in get‑
ting together in the provision of basic goods where that provision is, 
independently of institutions, dependent of all of us, and where we also 
depend on that provision in order to establish “conditions required for 
a flourishing life” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 28) or, indeed, even to survive.
In particular, there seems to be a class of basic goods whose provi‑
sion is truly global, and that may as such, with the application of an 
appropriate principle, render global egalitarian justice forceful. We 
believe the best example of such goods are environmental and climate 
goods, which are almost always commons, i.e. non ‑excludable and rival‑
rous (that is, individuals cannot be excluded from using them, but their 
use is not without a cost, as providing them to an individual means 
reducing availability to others). Typical examples of commons would 
be shared grazing pastures for the herds of a village and fisheries. 
While these examples have obvious boundaries (the size of the grazing 
pastures only goes so far and fisheries, if they are located in oceans, can 
potentially spread throughout the entirety of the oceans, but are so 
bounded nonetheless), it is consequent that they are not global. But 
with climate examples the situation is different, as it can be shown by 
our non ‑voluntary vulnerability to the practices of long distant others. 
Consider, for instance, that the provision of the air we breathe and, 
more importantly for our lives, its quality, is not so bounded. Climate 
change impacts are to be felt to some extent by all that live on Earth. 
So, the scope of these commons is global, and so is, quite inadvertently, 
their provision.
3 See Klosko (2005: 6 ‑9) for an alternative theory of how fairness may produce political obligations 
in the absence of voluntariness, and see Dagger & Lefkowitz (2014) for how duties need not be 
voluntary.
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Informal agreements and implicit rules are not uncommon in the 
management of the commons. Ostrom’s (1990) seminal contribution to 
Economics demonstrated plenty of instances in which the provision of 
such basic goods is not guaranteed by states, not made private, and 
which are nevertheless quite successful. Such agreements are necessary, 
for when agents act on their unbridled self ‑interest in exploiting com‑
mon pool resources, they risk what the literature has called a “tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), where these resources may reach 
depletion, or otherwise simply become unviable due to overexploita‑
tion. The overgrazed pastures are likely to overcome their carrying 
capacity, potentially leading to an ecological cascade effect. Schools of 
fish may altogether disappear from the oceans (especially if fertile 
adults are captured before giving birth to offspring). But in the case of 
climate commons we might witness a planetary ‑scale tragedy which 
might ultimately put our very lives at stake.
What these and other similar examples (e.g. Barrett, 2007 and Arne‑
son, 2016: 568) achieve for us is that they strip Sangiovanni’s aforemen‑
tioned thought experiment against coercion ‑based relational arguments 
of its institutional ‑basis while keeping it working in the sense that the 
remaining relations may be judged according to a principle that need 
not be so different from the principle of fairness, in that it is founded 
on reciprocity and autonomy. In any case, insofar as many commons 
constitute basic goods under worldwide interdependency, it is hard to 
see how a relational principle of justice could stick to state borders. 
Quite intuitively, at least, in such cases egalitarian justice should not 
conform to the shape of the state. Indeed, if we are right that the pro‑
vision of such basic goods as climate commons is truly global, then we 
have established relational foundations for a genuinely global egalitar‑
ianism.
The Principle of Cosmopolitan Inclusion
In order to overcome the limitations of the principle of fairness, we 
should adopt an alternative principle that does not depend on pre‑
‑existing institutions. In effect, the problem with the principle of 
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fairness is that it takes for granted the moral justification of the limits 
of existing political communities, and therefore the legitimacy of the 
scope of their territorial and personal jurisdictions. Alas, it is possible 
to question these assumptions, which are at the heart of the literature 
on the democratic ‑boundary problem.
To theoreticians of democracy, most notoriously Dahl (1970), it 
became clear that political power, either held by the people or by some 
subset of it, does not always solely affect those inhabitants of states in 
which policies are meant to apply. Not only have powers emerged 
which affect our lives but are largely operating outside the taming hand 
of states’ jurisdictions (such as multinational corporations), but also 
existing states’ inequalities of power express themselves quite arbitrar‑
ily in the way they determine the conditions of foreigners’ lives, way 
beyond the scope of their internationally recognized sovereignty over 
territorial jurisdiction (Bernstein & Coleman, 2009: 9). This is espe‑
cially clear when global collective action problems, such as the govern‑
ance of common goods, is at stake. As we saw, the stakeholders for 
climate change policy are not only those inhabitants of the state where 
the policies are made and targeted to apply. Nevertheless, because 
states invoke international law’s consecrated right to sovereign rule 
(UN Charter, Art.2.1.), they are permitted to deny foreigners from inter‑
fering with their environmental policy ‑making procedures, while 
legally interfering with the provision of basic goods of others, and thus 
tampering with their autonomy. That is, they abuse their right to auton‑
omy when violating others’ means to remain autonomous. The first 
all ‑affected interests principle was motivated by these realizations:
Dahl’s All ‑Affected Interests Principle: “Everyone who is affected by the deci‑
sions of a government should have the right to participate in that govern‑
ment” (1970: 64).
Dahl’s principle addresses the question of how we should establish 
the extension of political powers; it suggests that certain kinds of inter‑
actions are the causally relevant phenomena from which we are to track 
the scope of institutional justice; but it also tells us what ought to hap‑
pen so that the affectedness be morally justified (in particular, the 
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principle suggests that those whose interests are affected should be 
enfranchised).
More generally, all ‑affected interests principles’ claim there is a 
demand of justice to include others in our polity if our polity affects 
specific morally relevant interests of these others. Here we would like 
to argue that in doing so, they presuppose a principle that establishes 
the limits of political jurisdiction, or, in other words, a policy ‑making 
principle that we hereby call, in its most generic form, the
Principle of Institutionalization: inclusion under a political institution should 
correspond to the scope of duties and obligations of justice.
Dahl’s all ‑affected interests principle, for instance, seems to presup‑
pose a version of this principle which we may call:
Principle of Democratic Inclusion: “the scope of democratic political insti‑
tutions should correspond to the scope of obligations of justice” (Young, 
2000: 236).
Now, in line with what we have previously said about relationalism 
about justice, it is possible to discern between institutional theories of 
justice, according to which individuals’ rights, duties, and obligations 
exist only under a mediating institutional framework, and interactional 
theories of justice, for which individuals have rights and duties inde‑
pendently of institutions, and simply on account of agents’ interactions 
to each other (Pogge, 1992b: 90 ‑101 and Caney, 2005: 108). According 
to this rationale, and as our principle of institutionalization makes 
apparent, all ‑affected interests principles are characteristic of interac‑
tional theories of justice, for they presuppose the prior existence of 
duties of justice which apply to individuals and to which political 
inclusion should correspond.
This is, as we say, one way in which we differentiate our approach 
from that of the Rawlsians according to which justice is to be adjudi‑
cated among somewhat self ‑enclosed relations of cooperation under 
which rights and duties are distributed by an overarching legal frame. 
The Rawlsian understanding of (distributive) justice, as such, is 
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institutional (Rawls, 1971: 6), and not obviously compatible with the 
interactional understanding of justice presupposed by all ‑affected 
interests principles. We have seen, however, that there are good reasons 
not to restrict our approach to the institutional provision of basic goods.
It is on these bases that we therefore suggest the following version 
of an all ‑affected interests principle:
Principle of Cosmopolitan Inclusion: persons should engage in a polity if the 
provision of a basic good on which they depend in order to live autono‑
mous lives requires that they restrict their liberty according to cooperative 
rules that yield advantages for all, and, reflecting the nature of their affect‑
edness, they should on such circumstances enjoy equal rights, duties, and 
obligations as participants in the framework that would generate those 
rules, and should not use this polity to negate the rights of others not 
included in the polity.4
There is a lot we could write about this principle in its relation to 
issues of justice, governance, legitimacy, and overall prospects of appli‑
cation. In this essay, however, we have and will continue to restrict 
ourselves to solidifying our introduction of this principle, so that we 
may use future essays to focus on its development. Naturally, on adopt‑
ing such a principle it is advisable that we should argue for its value. 
One such value has to do with the easiness by which it can help adju‑
dicating matters of justice, as it formally binds interactants together, 
distributing their rights and duties. In the absence of such an “institu‑
tional vehicle” (Young, 2000: 249), individuals’ lives and needs would 
tend to remain invisible to others’ considerations. The principle of cos‑
mopolitan inclusion’s claim to institutionalization therefore establishes 
an individual civic duty according to which affected individuals should 
get together to form, at the very minimum, a well ‑ordered system 
instrumentally valuable for all concerned.
It is interesting to observe that both proponents of all ‑affected interests 
principles and Rawlsian institutionalists will agree that there should be a 
coupling between basic institutions and demands of justice. What the 
4 In order to build this principle, we took inspiration from Held’s (2004:147) principle of autonomy.
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institutionalists need in order to block the principle of institutionalization 
from inflating existing institutions is an argument to the point that there 
are no (strong) demands of justice that are independent of institutions 
(which includes (strong) duties between individuals of different states 
sharing no overarching institution), or no duty to form new institutions 
or extend the scope of nowadays institutions’ jurisdictional limits.
The existence of such an argument against inflating existing institu‑
tions will in turn depend on the relationship between the scope of 
affectedness and of demands of justice. But because existing principles 
deployed to conclude in favour of egalitarian justice latch on to auton‑
omy, survival, and the provision of basic goods, as ours does, it seems 
to be difficult to avoid the conclusion that follows from its application.
The principle of cosmopolitan inclusion is, naturally, inherently cos‑
mopolitan. This is due to recommending inclusion irrespectively of the 
group of belonging of all those affected. If anything, one could at best 
argue that affectedness is determinant of the group of belonging. How‑
ever, this would not be a correct appreciation of the sense of “group”, 
as those affected may not be recognized as affected or as members of 
one’s own group, nor might they want to be identified as belonging to 
the same group as those that affect them. The principle, however, claims 
that irrespectively of their social group identity, individuals share 
rights, duties, and obligations in virtue of their shared fate, as shown 
by their vulnerability and mutual affectedness.
To our modest understanding, political inclusion can be restricted to 
the scope of some relation and remain cosmopolitan “if we adopt an idea 
of association from which all the contingency of proximity and acquaint‑
ance is removed” (Vernon, 2010: 3). As it stands, the principle of cosmo‑
politan inclusion is independent of both acquaintance between the 
individuals concerned and designed to work under those very conditions 
in which proximity is overcome by such things as communications and 
other long ‑distance interdependencies in trade, environment, etc., as they 
have been brought about by globalization. Furthermore, for the applica‑
tion of the principle it does not matter whether there is “common recip‑
rocal interest in one another’s actions and choices” (Goodin, 2007: 48), for 
it is “interlinked interests” (Goodin, 2007: 49) not “interest in another’s 
interests”, which forms the basis of the principle’s imperative to include.
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Concluding Remarks
We can thus conclude that there are grounds for a global egalitarianism. 
And cosmopolitans can be thankful to globalization (and, in particular, 
to industrialization as it was driven by the engine of capitalism) for 
revealing the relational foundations for global egalitarianism, being, as 
they are, some of the most notorious drivers of anthropogenic climate 
change, on which we focused as our prime example.
But what is more important, insofar as it is true that institutionali‑
zation should track the scope of global egalitarian demands of justice, 
then persons should really be brought together under the inclusion of 
a global governance institution. Crucially, however, this global govern‑
ance institution is not a global state (meaning, not an all ‑pervasive form 
of global governance with coercive powers). It is, rather, an egalitarian 
institution for governing the domain of climate commons in particular. 
Perhaps the coronavirus pandemic could be used to show that other 
global governance institutions, with other subjects for their policies, 
could similarly be justified. These questions, and the question of how 
such institutions would relate to one another, we leave open.
We are also leaving open the question of what form of governance 
should be institutionalized. According to Dahl, to Young, and to the 
domestic egalitarians and liberal nationalists we confronted, like San‑
giovanni, the right way of adjudicating egalitarian justice is democratic. 
So, keeping up to their spirit, perhaps we should build a global dem‑
ocratic climate governance institution. Perhaps democracy would be 
ideal, too, in dealing with elements of justice which are not distributive, 
but have to do, for instance, with the disproportion of power, which is 
reflected in the way, say, the island ‑states in the Pacific can bargain in 
policy ‑making to prevent their own drowning (to which they have 
themselves barely contributed). Indeed, we focused on the relational 
foundations of distributive justice, but we did not address whether 
egalitarian justice is just distributive, or may also be itself relational5, 
counter ‑domination, among other options (see, e.g.: Tan, 2004: 118; 
5 We should not confuse relational foundations for determining the scope of egalitarianism with 
the possible relational nature of egalitarianism itself.
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Maffettone, 2014: 189; and Lovett, 2016). Such questions, as well as 
whether there could be other legitimate and more viable ways of con‑
stituting such cosmopolitan polities as that which we claim ought to 
govern the climate commons, we leave for future developments.
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